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PAUL, GAIUS, AND THE 'LAW OF PERSONS':
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ROMAN LAW IN
THE EARLY CLASSICAL PERIOD*
In the seventh chapter of his letter to the Romans, Paul of Tarsus wrote the following
words: 6 vd40osKVPLEVEL roO
4'
'aov XpovoV . Whilethe apostlePaul
dv0p'IrTov
may seem an unlikely point of departure for a study of Roman jurisprudence, these
nine words, as I hope to demonstrate, provide invaluable information regarding the
process by which Roman law was conceptualized and systematized. It is my
contention that these words, properly interpreted, yield the first occurrence of the
phrase 'law of persons' as well as the first evidence of a general theory of alieni ius, or
legal governance by another, in the Western legal tradition. I will begin by examining
the evidence from Roman legal literature for the origin of the phrase 'law of persons'.
Then I will turn to Paul's statement, offering a new interpretation and providing an
account of its connection with Roman law. Finally, I will suggest how this new
understanding of Paul contributes to the current scholarly discussion on the extent to
which Roman law was organized into conceptual categories in the early classical
period.1

'LAW OF PERSONS' IN ROMAN LAW
The phrase 'law of persons' first appears in extant Roman legal sources in Gaius'
four-volume Institutes near the middle of the second century A.D. Following a brief
preface on the nature of law, and immediately following the famous division of law
into persons, things, and actions, Gaius identifies his topic for the remainder of
Volume One as ius personarum.2While scholars of legal history still debate Gaius'
role in the creation of the threefold Institutionensystem,which has so fundamentally
shaped legal traditions in the West, there is no particular reason to believe that he
coined the phrase ius personarum. In fact, there are several indications he did not.
First, Gaius uses iuspersonarumwithout any explanation or introductory remark, a
sign, perhaps, that his audience was already familiar with the phrase from elsewhere.
Second, even though Gaius' presentation is divided into the categories persons, things,
and actions, he has no corresponding term for 'law of things' or 'law of actions'. This
is particularly noticeable at the beginning of Book 2, where he makes the transition
* H. D. Betz
gewidmet.

The followingbooks are cited more than twice in this study and will be referredto in

abbreviated form: C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentaryon the Epistle to the

Romans,2 vols (Edinburgh,1975-9);J.A. Fitzmyer,Romans(GardenCity,NY, 1993);Manfred
Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch (G6ttingen, 1960); F Stanley Jones, 'Freiheit' in den

undRechtsunterricht
BriefendesApostelsPaulus(G6ttingen,1987);Detlef Liebs,'Rechtsschulen
im Prinzipat',ANRW2.15 (1976), 197-286;PeterStein, 'Thedevelopmentof the institutional
Institutes(London,1983),
system',in P.G. Steinand A.D.E. Lewis(edd.),Studiesin Justinian's
151-63; Alan Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic(Oxford, 1974); Franz Wieacker,

der r6mischenFachjurisRimischeRechtsgeschichte
1 (Munich,1988);id., 'iber das Verhiiltnis
Theorie',lura20 (1969),448-77.
prudenzzurgriechisch-hellenistischen
2 Gai. Inst. 1.9;also at 1.48and2.1 (seenextnote).
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from ius personarumto simple res.3If Gaius had originated the former expression, we
would have expected this manner of terminology to continue into his consideration of
both res and actiones.4
Third, the organizational structure of the Institutes varies considerably throughout
the work.5The section covering iuspersonarum(1.9-200) is more explicit and unified in
its structure than those covering res (Books 2 and 3) and actiones (Book 4), being
divided into dichotomies and trichotomies that stand in hierarchical relations to one
another. The treatment of res, by contrast, consists of three discrete units that are
introduced and arranged variously. The first unit (2.1-96) begins with several
fundamental definitions, including the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal
property and a summadivisio, none of which, however,bear directly on the structure of
this unit. The discussion then moves, without benefit of any clear transition, to a
lengthy consideration of the acquisition of individual things, a topic explicitly
identified only in the transition to the second unit (2.97). Both this and the second unit
(2.97-3.87), which covers the acquisition of complete holdings, adhere largely to a
sequential ordering of items, with little hierarchical structure.Obligations (3.88-225),
on the other hand, begins with a transition that is 'very abrupt and hard', but then
follows 'an especially clear architecture'.6 A summa divisio begins this unit (3.88),
arranging the material into two distinct genera (cf. 3.182). Each of these is further
divided into four genera (3.89, 182), the last genus of the first fourfold division being
subdivided into four (3.135), the first genus of the second fourfold division being
subdivided into two (3.183). Lastly, the treatment of actiones in Book 4 arranges items
into traditional groupings and deals with them sequentially, with no overarching
schema and little use of hierarchy.
A widely held explanation for this diversity in organizational structure is that Gaius'
presentation of private law brings together various patterns of conceptualization that
go back prior to the Institutes.' Thus his treatment of ius personarum,which displays a
coherency noticeably more advanced than his treatment of things and actions, may
have been conceptualized, at least in part, by jurists before Gaius; and if this is true, it
is a small step to suggest that the name also existed before Gaius.
Given these indications that iuspersonarummay not have been coined by Gaius, the
question arises as to how far back before Gaius we may reasonably postulate its
existence. My own view, as I will make clear in the next two sections, is that the phrase
was current at least as early as the mid-first century A.D.For now, however, I would like
to prepare the way for that argument by reviewing the evidence from late Republican
and early classical legal literature.
To begin with, we know that the process of grouping civil laws generatim began in
the early first century B.C.with the publication of Q. Mucius Scaevola's ius civile. We
modouideamusde rebus(cf.4.1). This
de iurepersonarum
commentario
exposuimus;
3 Superiore

is an emended text, based on Inst. lust. and Gai. Epitome 2.1 pr. It is the reading proposed by

G6schenandfollowedby all subsequenteditors.
4 Gerhardvon Beseler,'EinzelneStellen',ZRG46 (1928),268 even suggestedbracketingde
iureat 1.9on groundsthatit was 'stylisticallya foreignelement'.
5 Forthisandwhatfollowssee Fuhrmann,104-15.
6 Fuhrmann,108, n. 1 and 109;cf. ReinhardZimmermann,TheLaw of Obligations
(Cape
Town and Boston, 1990; repr. 1992), 26.
H. L. W. Nelson (with M. David), Oberlieferung,Aufbau und Stil
7 So Fuhrmann, 118, 183-6;
von Gai Institutiones (Leiden, 1981), 376-8, 381-94; id., review of lus civile in artem redactumby
H. J. Mette, Mnemosyne 14 (1961), 371; Stein, 154-6; Wieslaw Litewski, review of Gaiusnoster by
O. Stanojevi6, ZRG 108 (1991), 463-5; cf. Liebs, 235; Zimmermann (n. 6), 1-26.
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also know that Mucius' use of genera was taken up and refined by his younger
contemporary Servius, as well as many prominent lawyers after him, and that Mucius'
student Cicero advocated the creation of an ars iuris civilis, wherein the entire civil law
code would be organized hierarchicallyinto categories and subcategories.8One could
postulate, therefore, that in this intellectual climate a conceptual principle or generic
heading such as 'law of persons' might well have arisen.
Against this, however, we must take into account the prevailing scholarly opinion
that, overall, Roman jurists made only minimal use of genus as an organizing tool in
their writings. According to Wieacker,Mucius' genera are of the fourth and fifth level,
without any possibility for subcategories below them; and likewise, Watson finds no
use of species in Republican law.9 Moreover, there is no hard evidence that Mucius
or any lawyer before Gaius created an overview of civil law using broad concepts or
headings on the order of 'law of persons'. Accordingly, many scholars, perhaps the
majority, have argued for the originality of Gaius, maintaining that the systemization
of private law, in any meaningful sense of that word, begins with the Institutes.10
Yet this objection may skew the evidence, for it focuses only on the upper echelon of
Roman legal literature.Gaius' Institutes, by contrast, is literature of a very low order:
a textbook or primer, not for lawyers or even law students, but for students receiving
formal legal instruction as part of a liberal education." In turn, Gaius' pedagogical
concerns, which may have included an organized presentation of his subject accessible
to those outside the legal profession, would not have been shared by prominent legal
writers such as Mucius, Servius,Alfenus, Sabinus,or Neratius.'2Moreover, as Frier has
made clear, Mucius' larger agenda for transforming the legal profession actually
militated against the use of genera and the creation of a grand system of civil law such
as Cicero envisioned.'3 Thus, Cicero's efforts to promote an ars iuris civilis should not
be seen as a failed attempt to extend Mucius' innovation to its natural conclusion in the
professional legal literature,but as a new direction altogether, aimed at the classroom.
In light of this, it is at least plausible to postulate that running alongside the
8 For currentresearch
on theseissues,see Wieacker(n. 1, 1988)1.597-638;id. (1969),463-9;
Watson, 123-95; BruceW. Frier,The Rise of the RomanJurists(Princeton,1985), 155-71;
MaximilianHerberger,Dogmatik:Zur Geschichtevon Begriff und Methodein Medizinund
Jurisprudenz
(Frankfort,1981),46-57;andStein,151-4.
9 Wieacker(1988),1.634-5;id. (1969),465-6;andWatson,183-4, 191-2.Cf. Sen.Ep. 58.8-12,
whereSenecadiscussesthe useof genusandspeciesas a curiosity.Butsee also ElizabethRawson,
'Theintroductionof logicalorganisationin Romanproseliterature',
Papersof theBritishSchool
at Rome46 (1978),27-9, whoattemptsto qualifytheseimpressions.
"0See especiallyA. M. Honor6,Gaius(Oxford,1962),63-5, and the authorslistedin Liebs,
231, n. 186.
" FranzWieacker,'GriechischeWurzelndes
ZRG 70 (1953), 102-3;
Institutionensystems',
Liebs,235;cf W.W.Buckland,A Text-Book
of RomanLaw(Cambridge,19633),60.
"2Wieacker(1988), 1.635;id. (1969),467;cf. Fuhrmann,187-8;and Watson,108-9. See also
Cic.De Or. 1.85-91,whereCrassusstatesexplicitlythatthecreationof a systematicpresentation
is necessaryfor outsidersand beginners,but insidersand advancedstudentshaveno particular
needfor one.
" Frier
on isolatedhypotheticalcasesdetersthe inherentstrivingof
(n. 8), 169:'concentration
legal sciencetowardsystematicdogmatism,by keepinglaw firmlyorientedto concretelegal
relationshipswithwhichdoctrineis alwaysobligedto deal.Alreadyin Q. Mucius'writingsthere
emergesan avoidanceof grand system, an avoidancethat will characterizelater Roman
texts.'Seealso Herberger(n. 8), 55-76, 106-20;Ferdinando
jurisprudence
exceptin introductory
Bona, 'L'idealeretoricociceronianoed il "iuscivile in artemredigere"',Studiaet documenta
historiaeet iuris46 (1980),333-66;BrunoSchmidlin,'Horoi,pithanaundregulae-Zum Einflul3
der Rhetorikund Dialektikauf die juristischeRegelbildung',ANRW2.15 (1976), 104-5;and
Rawson(n. 9), 29-31.
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professional legal literature, in which genus plays such a minor part as an organizing
feature, there was a more popular, pedagogical tradition which aimed at organizing
helpful topics of private law under broad conceptual headings or even by genus and
sub-genus. Indeed, this may have begun in Cicero's day or shortly thereafter, for not
only does he articulate the plan for this venture, but the rise of jurists about this time
and their promotion of a 'legal science' began to open up the law to a wider audience,
providing the demand for such an innovation. And since legal scholarship at this low
level would have been an oral tradition,14it is no surprise that it is not documented
until Gaius, whose Institutes may themselves derive from a student's classroom notes
rather than deliberate publication by the author.
To be sure, there is nothing necessary or inevitable about this suggested development. As Honor6 has observed, the oral exposition of law need not give rise to system
or be dependent on it.15 Nevertheless, I find this hypothesis of a lower-level, oral
tradition attractive inasmuch as it is able to explain how an advanced systemization of
the civil code could appear seemingly out of nowhere in the mid-second century A.D.,
without appealing to the genius and originality of an otherwise obscure 'Gaius'. It
may also provide the most satisfying explanation as to why this singular achievement,
despite its popularity (as attested by the papyri and its very survival), had no
discernible impact on the legal profession for more than two and a half centuries after
its publication.16
Returning to the phrase ius personarum: if, as I am suggesting, Gaius' work
belonged to a minor, oral tradition, isolated from the interests of mainstream lawyers,
then the appearance of this phrase in his Institutes may not mark a dramatic
development in second-century legal science. Rather, it may be the product of an
evolving tradition of advanced liberal education." Thus, especially in view of our
earlier observations about the existence of ius personarumprior to Gaius, it seems not
at all unreasonable to leave open the possibility that this phrase was used in private law,
even as early as the first century A.D.,to designate either a legal principle or a genus of
law. With this, let us turn to the evidence provided by Paul's letter to the Romans.

'LAW OF PERSONS' IN ROMANS 7.1
By most accounts, Paul's letter to the Romans was written c. A.D. 55-60 from the
Greek city of Corinth to a Christian community at Rome. In the seventh chapter of
this letter, in the midst of an explanation of Christian salvation, Paul introduces a
legal principle, gives an example of how it works, and then applies both the principle
and the example to his ongoing argument. The verse containing the legal principle
AaA, 0"t 0 v0/_Lo'
(7.1) reads: "H dyVOEL^TE,
yap VdOLov
ywLVaKOVULV
dEEA•o0I, o
the
t70
.
vOpATTrovU
e•" 'aov XpOVOV Throughout history of Christian
KUpLEV•L
14 Liebs, 229-30, 235; cf. Wieacker(1988), 1.616. H. von Arnim, Hieroklesethische
Elementarlehre
A.D.Stoicprimeron ethics.
(Berlin,1906),xvi-xviidescribesa second-century
15 T. Honor6, review of Oberlieferung,Aufbauund Stil von Gai Institutionesby H. L. W. Nelson,
Revue d'Histoire du Droit 58 (1990), 473.
16T Honor6,'Gaius(2)', OCD3, 620 suggeststhat Gaius'statusas a provincialaccountsfor

this lackof recognition.Naturally,theseexplanationsarenot mutuallyexclusive.
17This also makes intelligiblewhy ius personarumappears prominentlyin Gaius as the
organizingheadfor his firstmajordivisionof lawand then not againuntilthe sixthcenturyin
Justinian'sInstitutes,and thereonly in passagesdependenton Gaius. It was part of an oral
traditionwhoseeffortsat makingthe lawaccessibleto a wideraudienceweregiventheirdue by
the legalestablishment
reforms.
onlyduringJustinian's
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biblical interpretation this has been consistently translated along these lines: 'Or, do
you not know, brothers-for I speak to ones who know law-that the law has
jurisdiction over a person as long as he lives?' Yet, if this is correct, a problem arises
in the next two verses, for the example that Paul gives does not illustrate this principle.
In Romans 7.2-3 he writes:
T ) av8po'S. xpa ovv
a7TroO
vO Vot/OVo

EcL v yE•v-qTrat
Tovdav8posvroo-r
ioLXaALs
XP'I7/LatL
a
o-rov vdtov, rov /CL7
av-r-v
davSpET pp•C v 8E ci7oOcvn a
vcrp, E4A•upa
ELvcyr
urv&•aw
/IotXaA(8ayEvotE'vr'vVspt E-r7pw.
For the marriedwomanis boundby lawto the livinghusband.But if the husbanddies, she is
releasedfromthe law of the husband.Thus,whilethe husbandlives,she will be consideredan
adulteressif she marriesanotherman;18but if the husbanddies,she is freefromthe law,to the
end that she is not an adulteressif she marriesanotherman.
Thus even though 7.2-3 is quite obviously intended to illustrate the legal principle in
7.1 (as indicated by the introductory ydp), the principle, in this understanding, speaks
of a person being governed by the law as long as that person lives, while the illustration speaks of a wife being bound to her husband for as long as her husband lives.
To put the matter another way, the 'person' in 7.1 does not correspond to any of those
mentioned in 7.2-3: not the husband, the wife, or the 'other man'.
This inconsistency has long been recognized, and over the centuries several
solutions have been offered, none of which is very satisfying. These include an
allegorical interpretation of the passage in which the law is understood to be the first
husband, the wife the redeemed self, and so on; several attempts to smooth over or
ignore the difficulty by focusing attention on Paul's 'overall meaning' or describing
7.2-3 as a 'corollary'or 'tertiumcomparationis'to the principle in 7.1; efforts to identify
different types of analogical thinking used by Paul, such as 'sequential analogy'; and,
finally, the simple admission that the passage just does not make sense on any level.'9
Rather than choosing from among these competing solutions, concerning which
there is no scholarly consensus in sight, I would like to suggest that the problem may be
solved by translating the legal principle in 7.1 in a different manner. Instead of the
traditional reading, I propose we translate 0 vd1os KUpLEVELTrov &vOp-rr7TOVU
Ea' JOV
Xpdvov as, 'the law of the person has jurisdiction as long as he [the person] lives'. In
thisv^,
rendering the verb is taken to be intransitive and its subject is 'the law of the
person', a phrase that carries a technical ring, as if referring to a specific aspect of a
legal code.20This avoids the problem of inconsistency with the next two verses, for the
law can now be understood as havingjurisdiction over others during a person'slifetime.
That is what 7.2-3 illustrates: the law, now identified expressly as 'the law of the
husband' (7.2), has jurisdiction over a wife during the husband's lifetime.
In considering the merits of this interpretation-beyond, that is, its principal merit,
that it makes sense of the argument in 7.1-3-we may note that it provides an
explanation for other aspects of this passage beyond what the traditional translation
can offer. First, it brings into focus the deliberateemphasis that one sees in the phrases
q i ravspos yUvv-and 70o vd4too 7rot avSpdo in 7.2 in a way that the traditional
'8 Forthisidiomsee below,n. 36.
See the discussions in Herbert M. Gale, The Use of Analogy in the Letters of Paul
'9

(Philadelphia,1964),189-98;Cranfield1.331-5;JoyceA. Little,'Paul'suse of analogy',Catholic
Biblical Quarterly(1984), 82-90; Fitzmyer, 454-7; and J. D. Earnshaw, 'Reconsidering Paul's

Studies(1994),68-88.
marriage
analogyin Romans7.1-4', New Testament
20 Forthe
syntax,see below,especiallynn. 31 and 53.
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interpretation cannot. If Paul's point is simply that the law governs a person only
during his own lifetime, then not only (as we have said) is the example in 7.2-3
misconceived, but his description of the wife as 'under a husband' and released from
'the law of the husband' adds nothing to his argument.21If, however, he intends to
show that law can govern others during a person's lifetime, then these phrases fit in
perfectly, for they underscore the legal limitations imposed on the wife by her
husband's being alive. We might add that the phrase 'the law of the husband' parallels
'the law of the person', thereby solidifying the continuity in thought between 7.1 and
7.2-3, a continuity now based on 'law' rather than, as in the traditional translation, on
the impossible task of identifying the 'person' in 7.1 with one of the persons in 7.2-3.
Second, regarding Paul's own style, if this author had wanted to say, 'the law has
jurisdiction over a person', we should have expected simply dvpdwc'ov, not -rot
in examples elsewhere to refer to
d&vpd`rov.This is because, when Paul uses avOppwrros
'a person', he does so without the article.22To the extent that this Pauline usage also
holds true in 7.1, the article before dvOpdonrov
is another indication that Paul intended
'
this noun as an adnominal genitive dependent on vo4pos,not as the genitive object of
KUpLEVEt.

Third, my translation explains why Paul introduces the legal principle in 7.1 with the
words 'for I speak to ones who know law'. In the traditional reading there would seem
to be no reason for this elaborate introduction (found only here in Paul), for the
principle that law governs people only during their own lifetimes is common sense.
Moreover, not only has Paul already begun the verse with an introduction that would
appear sufficient for this ('Or, do you not know, brothers.. .'23), but he has introduced
a similar notion without comment earlier in 6.7-14.24 Beyond this, in Galatians 3.15 he
uses a more complex example involving the ratification and annulment of a person's
will, introducing it simply as 'common knowledge' (KaTd
av Opwrvo AE'yw); and in
Galatians 4.1-2 he makes referenceto inheritance law and the age of majority without
any explanatory introduction. If, however,we adopt the suggestion that 'the law of the
person' is a piece of legal jargon, then Paul's elaborate introduction would serve to
alert his audience to the fact that a certain degree of legal expertise is required to
appreciate his argument.
In sum, there seems to be ample reason to reject the traditional understanding of
Romans 7.1 in favour of the one offered here. When Paul wrote 6 v'Los, KVPEptEEL
70o
he meant 'the law of the person has jurisdiction .. .', not 'the law has
avOpcw"rov,
jurisdiction over a person'.
Finally, let me return to my proposal above that 'the law of the person' has a
technical legal ring to it. This notion is suggested by the distinctiveness, or one might
21

Indeed,the latterphrasehas beenfairlymysteriousto somebiblicalscholars.C. K. Barrett,

A Commentaryon the First Epistle to the Corinthians(New York, 1968), 136 even suggests reading
r
vpdo ('of the law, i.e. the husband'), an idea first proposed by
70o vdopovin apposition to T70t
Origen, Commentariiin evangeliumJoannis 13.44-5.
22 Namely Romans 1.23, 2.9, 3.28, 7.24; 1 Corinthians 2.9, 2.14, 4.1, 6.18, 7.1, 7.26, 11.28; 2
Corinthians 12.2, 12.4; Galatians 2.6, 2.16, 3.15, 6.1, 6.7; Philippians 2.8; and 1 Thessalonians
4.8. (These passages exclude Paul's use of AvOpworos
with a preposition or other modifiers, which
are constructions governed by different syntactical conventions.) 1 Corinthians 2.11 might seem
to be an exception, but the construction 7daroT dvOp60brovis determined by its parallelism with
Trd&
70o OEo, a factor not relevant to Romans 7.1.
23 This and variations on it are standard
introductory formulae in Paul: Romans 1.13, 6.3,
11.25; 1 Corinthians 10.1, 12.1; 2 Corinthians 1.8; 1 Thessalonians 4.13.
24
Namely that death frees one from enslavement to sin, which is the result of law.
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say awkwardness, of the phrase itself; by its rarity,25which is often an indication of
technical jargon; and by Paul's introduction to it, 'for I speak to ones who know law'.
It is further supported by the words KUptEVEL... ..
, which are
''OOV
XpO'VOV
have
in a
interwoven with 6
.
these
words
for
good
parallels
ro.
vOp7dirov,
v6d1oS...
wide range of legal
materials. The use of KUpLEUw in the sense of 'having legal
jurisdiction over' is attested from the fourth century B.C.and occurs frequently with this
meaning in the Hellenistic and Roman periods.26Sometimes it is paired with adverbs
of time, like Paul's 10' u'aovXpdvov
These include Kr'T ETOS, ES, EW aV,27 and
(,?.
vv.28
In
a
papyrus
from
Tebtunis
at the end of the second century B.C.,
dlEXp o70

moreover, we have a very close parallel:
... KaL rPoalTosEEL8tX7Twv daro -v To
k crov'7rEpLt2avXPOVOV.
V e"
avLjrw

TOV YOVELg
avyypawcov XPdVOV KEKptLEUKEVatL

... and having demonstrated that from the time of the written contracts their parents had legal

jurisdiction,as long as theywerealive.29
Not only does this text use an adverb of time practically identical to Paul's,30but the
verb
which usually takes an object, is intransitive, as in my proposed
KVPLEoW,,
translation.31
Beyond this evidence, the legalese of Paul's language in 7.1 is confirmed by the next
two verses. The same technical awkwardness that I have attributed to 'the law of the
'the living husband'.32
person' is also palpable in 7.2 in the phrase c- (?VrL
dovSpI,
This is probably the forensic twin of a phrase like 'the deceased
husband', as it is one
of three expressions in 7.1-3 whose function is to specify, for legal purposes, that a
person is living rather than dead. The other two are 4 ' u'ov Xpdvov 5n in 7.1, whose
O v3pdS in 7.3, which may well
JZV
ror o70
be the Greek equivalent of vivomarito, a phrase found
in early classical law.33Both rTc
and
rare
70 dvpdo are, moreover,
expressions,which,as in the
5(cVdvTpl
ovroZ roT
case of c vodos70Tovo
is
of
another
potentialsign jargon.34
dvOpdWrov,
legal provenance we have just discussed, and

25

Elsewhereonlyat 2 Samuel7.19(LXX);see below.

26 See Aeschines, In Timarchum1.35; Hyperides, Epitaphiuscol. 9, line 5 (Jensen) (= Stob. Flor.

4.23.35.2); Raphael Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-RomanEgypt in the Light of the Papyri

(Warsaw,1955),230-2;andDiod. Sic. 1.27.2(reEgyptianmarriagecontracts).
27
28
29

PTeb 105.47; POxy 3.910.24-5, 8.1124.6-7.
PTorChoach 11 bis 56; 12 V.19-20 (= UPZ 2.161.56, 162 V.19-20).
PTorChoach 12 IX.15-17 (= UPZ 162 IX.15-17). This is from the Hermias suit over a

ownedby the ThebanChoachytes.
building
30

Also found in PTorChoach 11.11, 11 bis 12-13, 12 1.22-23 (= UPZ 2.160.11, 161.12-13, 162
1.22-3); and PTeb 771.8-9.

3' The intransitiveuse of KvpLEUw is uncommonbut well documented.Aside from the two
referencesin n. 28, see:PEleph14.22;Polybius8.18.6,11.6.3;Philo,Leg.Alleg.3.220;Cher.74 (=
Exodus 15.9);1 Maccabees7.8; and Sirach44.3. See also Sext. Emp.Math. 8.97, whichmay
derivefromtheearlyStoa or the Dialecticalschool,accordingto TheodorEbert,Dialektikerund

friihe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus(G6ttingen, 1991), 88, n. 12.

the phraseis almost alwaysglossed as if the participlewas
32 Becauseof its awkwardness
circumstantial
('whilethe husbandis alive')ratherthanattributive.
33 Only in Dig. lust. 24.1.11.3(= Ulp. Sabinus32, citing Marcellus);
35.1.61pr. (= Ulp. Lex

Julia et Papia 8); and 42.1.23 pr. (= Paulus, Plautius 6).
34

Thefirstoccursonlyhere;thesecondis foundonlyhereandat Plut.De mul.vir.257 F 4; and

Cass. Dio, Hist. Rom. (Xiph. ep.) 93.30 (Dindorf-Steph.). Cf. Philo, De Spec. Leg. 1.105, 129;
3.27, 30.
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ROMANS 7.1 AS A REFERENCE TO THE ROMAN LAW OF PERSONS
Thus far we have argued that the phrase 'law of persons' existed in Roman law before
Gaius; that Paul used the expression 'the law of the person' in Romans 7.1; and that
this expression derives from a legal context. We are now in a position to ask
and Gaius' ius
whether there is any connection between Paul's 6
vo'•os rToi dvOpcrrov
personarum.
To begin with, we should recognize that most New Testament scholars rule out this
possibility altogether, contending that vdo'os in 7.1 refers to Mosaic Law, or Torah,
rather than Roman (or Greek) law. They note that vo4posusually has this meaning in
Paul, and that in 7.4-6, where Paul applies the principal of 7.1, vdo'osclearly means
Torah. In their view, it is unreasonable to think that Paul would move so casually from
one system of law to another in the space of so few verses.35
The weakness of this argument is twofold. First, it is dependent on the traditional
translation of the principle in 7.1, 'the law has jurisdiction over a person as long as he
lives'. While this principle is not found in the Torah per se, these scholars assume that
it is of such an obvious and general nature that Paul could easily attribute it to the
Torah without further ado. Yet not only does this assumption fit poorly with Paul's
address to his readers as 'ones who know law', which seems to presuppose more than
just general knowledge (see above), but if, as I have argued, the principle in 7.1 should
be translated as 'the law of the person has jurisdiction . . .', then its absence from the
Torah becomes very problematic, for there is nothing obvious about it (and hence
Paul's illustration of it in 7.2-3).
Second, the argument overlooks Paul's use of vo'4osin 7.2-3, where it surely means
something other than Torah. This becomes clear if we compare 7.2-3 to Deuteronomy
24.1-4 (LXX). In that passage we are told that if a woman is divorced by her husband,
marries another man (ydv'Trat-t v3ptPL
and then is released from the second
second husband, she may not remarrythe first
marriage by divorce or the death of thedrE'p,),
husband. The assumption here is that a woman may lawfully marry a second time
while her first husband is still alive, an assumption not contradicted elsewhere in the
Torah. This, however, is the opposite of what Paul claims in Romans 7.2-3, namely
that a wife is 'bound by law to the living husband', and that 'while the husband lives,
she will be considered an adulteress if she marries another man' (yE'V-ral dJv8p
Since Paul uses the same Hebrew idiom for marrying as does the Mosaic
OrE'pcg).
passage, it is quite possible, moreover,that the wording of Romans 7.2-3 is an allusion
to the Mosaic ruling and was actually formulated in opposition to it.36
Indeed, the most likely provenance of the tradition in 7.2-3 is not the Torah but
Jesus' prohibition of divorce as found in the Gospels. Like 7.2-3, Jesus' prohibition
455-7 fordiscussionandreferences.
A notableexceptionis E. Kiisemann,
35 See e.g. Fitzmyer,

Commentaryon Romans (Grand Rapids, 1980), 187.

36 It is not necessary,
of course,to assumethatPaulformulatedthewordingof Romans7.2-3.
It may dependon an older tradition,as severalJewishand Christiandiscussionsof divorce
around this time allude to Deuteronomy24.1-4 in an attemptto modify or replaceit. See
Matthew5.31 and Mark 10.4;and JohnJ. Collins,'Marriage,divorce,and familyin Second
TempleJudaism',in Leo G. Perdueet al. (edd.),Familiesin AncientIsrael(Louisville,1997),
117-18.
For the meaningof the Hebrewidiom,see its recurrence
at 7.4;Cranfield,1:333,n. 5; andcf.
Jones, 119, n. 44. To my knowledge,before the third centuryit is attested outside of the
Septuagintand Paul only in Philo,who is also commentingon Deuteronomy24.1-4 (De Spec.

Leg. 3.30).
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also characterizes a wife's remarriage as an act of 'adultery' and is presented as a
corrective to Deuteronomy 24.1-4.37 That Paul was familiar with some form of this
tradition is confirmed by 1 Corinthians 7, where he even seems to elevate it to the
status of a 'commandment of God' (vTroA3) 0Eot3)over against the Mosaic commandments.38Thus, despite its popularity among New Testament scholars, there is no
validity to the notion that vodLosin 7.1 must refer to the Torah simply because the word
has this meaning in 7.4-6, for already in 7.2-3, which provides the illustration for the
principle in 7.1, Paul uses vodos-three times with a decidedly non-Mosaic meaning.39
Returning to 6 vdoLos-70ro avOpdrrovand its possible connection to ius personarum,
it would appear that Roman law is the best candidate for the source of Paul's words.
While Paul knew Torah and may have been acquainted with certain features of Greek
law, and while both Jewish and Greek traditions developed private law pertaining to
persons, there is no evidence that these traditions ever systematized private law or'
developed broad conceptual categories.40 There is not even a Hebrew equivalent for
and outside of Romans 7.1 it occurs in Greek only in the
vo4os o70 &vOpconrov;
Septuagint translation of 2 Samuel 7.19, where it refers to God's 'will for the people' or
'purpose for humanity', not a legal system.41 By contrast, 6 vdo'os 7ro0~av6pdnov
would be a logical way to render ius personaruminto Greek, especially given that the
more literal translation, 6 vdtosg rcv dvOpdv7Trv,was already in use by Greek writers
as a way to refer to 'human law' over against 'divine will'.
Apart from iuspersonarumbeing the only legal term from these three traditions that
might correspond to Paul'sphrase, it suggests itself as the Latin counterpart to 6 vdt-os70ro dvO6porovin another important way as well. As several scholars have remarked,
under iuspersonarumGaius understands not rights and duties of persons, but the rules
governing how a person attains and loses various positions of status in Roman
society.42In fact, ius often means 'legal position' or 'authority' in Gaius, and thus ius
personarum could be fairly translated as 'the legal position of persons'.43 Paul, by
37 Matthew 5.31; Mark 10.4.
38 See 1 Corinthians7.10-11, 19, and my discussionin Paul on Marriage and Celibacy

(Cambridge,1995),169-73.
39 Another possibility,favouredby a few scholars,is that Romans7.2-3 is dependenton
extra-canonical
'Jewishlaw'fromthis period,as practisedin the synagogueand latercodifiedin
the MishnaharoundA.D.200.Thesescholarscontendthatthedistinctivelegalfeatureof Romans
7.2-3 that earmarksit as 'Jewishlaw'is that it deniesa wife the rightto divorce,a stipulation
foundin Josephusand the Mishnahbut not in Greekor Romanlaw.Seee.g. JamesD. G. Dunn,
Romans(Dallas,1988),359-60, 368.The problemwiththis is threefold.First,outsidethe Torah
thereis no normativebody of Jewishlaw in the first centuryA.D.such that Paul could make
referenceto it in passingand expecthis audiencein Rome,most of whomhe had nevermet, to
recognizethe reference.Especiallyon the issueof a wife'srightto divorce,theremayhavebeena
numberof legal views-see Collins(n. 36), 119-21;and DavidInstoneBrewer,'Jewishwomen
divorcingtheir husbandsin early Judaism',HarvardTheologicalReview92 (1999), 349-57.
Second,it is not at all clearwhyPaulwouldprefera synagoguetraditionto a widelydisseminated
teachingof Jesuson the sametopic.Andfinally,a wife'srightto divorcedoesnot appearto be the
definingissuein 7.2-3, but ratherthe indissolubilityof marriageuntil her husband'sdeath(see
esp.verse3). As thisappearsto excludethe husband'srightto divorceas well,the closestparallel
is withtheJesustradition,as I havearguedabove-see also P.J.Tomson,PaulandtheJewishLaw
(Assenand Minneapolis,1990),111,120-1.
40ForJewishlaw,see BoazCohen,JewishandRomanLaw(NewYork,1966),1.126.
Hebrewis corrupt.
41 The underlying
42 Stein, 158; Buckland (n. 11), 58-9; H.
E Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law
(Oxford,1957),66-9; A. M. Prichard,Leage'sRomanPrivateLaw (Londonand New York,
1961),63.
(1988),1.270-1,491-3;Stein,161;id., 'Thefateof the institutionalsystem',in The
43 Wieacker
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comparison, is concerned with an aspect of this same subject, namely the general
theory of how a person's legal status changes when the legal governance of that person
by another ends. The apostle illustrates this, as we have seen, with the example of a
woman who is at first b'tav3pos, 'under a husband's (legal) authority', but then is
relinquished from 6 vo'tos -roi dv8pdo,'the law (legal authority?) of the husband', by
his death. In Gaius these matters are addressed in a lengthy discussion of persons
'subject to another's authority' (alieni iuris), which is the second major division of the
iuspersonarum (1.48-123), and in a discussion of the ways in which those in another's
authority are freed from it (quo modo ii qui alieno iuri subiecti sunt eo iure liberentur,
1.124ff.). The first way Gaius mentions is death, as in Paul, followed by loss of
citizenship, which is the legal equivalent of death (1.127-9).44
In all, there seems to be sufficient correspondence between Paul's 'the law of the
person' and Gaius' 'law of persons' to conclude that they both have reference to the
same nexus of ideas in Roman law, albeit at different stages in the development of this
nexus. What Paul knows as a principle of law Gaius knows as a formulation that lies
somewhere between a principle and the designation of one of three divisions of civil
law.
As for the supposed problem with Paul's varied use of vdo'osin 7.1-6-Roman legal
principle (1), Christian prohibition (2-3), and Mosaic law (4-6)-I would argue that
this is comprehensible inasmuch as Paul is attempting to demonstrate the legal
abrogation of one system of law (Mosaic law) by setting it in another, larger legal
framework. Beginning with the principle 'the law of the person', which he and his contemporaries may have understood as a universal principle of law rather than an
exclusively 'Roman' principle, Paul illustrates this principle with a legal pronouncement attributed to Jesus, and then applies it to the Mosaic law code. I find nothing
particularly unlikely or extraordinaryin this.

THE LAW OF PERSONS IN CORINTH AROUND A.D.50
At this point it remains to ask how Paul might have learned of the Roman law of
persons. One might speculate that as a Roman citizen Paul received an overview of
civil law as part of his education. But since Paul was probably born in Tarsus in the
first two decades of the first century A.D., this would require the existence of
elementary legal instruction in Tarsus already in the early part of the century. While
this is not impossible, given our theory of an oral pedagogical tradition and given the
moderate educational resources in Tarsus at this time, it is nevertheless highly
speculative.45

A more promising hypothesis, which does not necessarily exclude the first, is that
CharacterandInfluenceof the RomanCivilLaw (Londonand Ronceverte,1988),74. This fact
'lawof things'or 'lawof actions'.
mayhelpin explainingwhyGaiushas no corresponding
4 Admittedly,his discussionherepertainsto personsin postestateparentis;but accordingto
the likelyreconstruction
of a badlydamagedpassage,Gaiusholds thatthe situationis the same
forwivesunderthe powerof husbands(137-137a).
seeJeromeMurphy-O'Connor,
Paul(Oxford,1996),34-5. It should
45 Foreducationin Tarsus,
also be takeninto accountthat our one sourcewhichidentifiesPaul as a Romancitizenalso
indicatesthat he took his advancedstudiesnot in Tarsusbut Jerusalem(Acts 16.37-8,22.3),an
altogether unlikely setting for instructionin Romanjurisprudence.The reliabilityof this
informationhas beenquestionedby some,however.Seee.g. RaymondE. Brown,AnIntroduction
to the New Testament(New York,1997),423-6; and W WardGasque,'Tarsus',AnchorBible
Dictionary 6 (1992), 334.
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Paul became acquainted with various aspects of Roman law through his contact with
Roman courts in the provinces.As I have shown elsewhere,46it is quite likely that Paul's
congregation in Corinth became involved in a lawsuit over the marital status of one of
its members. While the details of the case are not always clear, it seems that following
the death of his father a man had married or taken up sexual relations with his
stepmother. This was seen by some in the congregation as immoral, and since the man
would not change his ways they took him to court. They lost their case, however, and
so the matter was left unresolved by the court decision, at least as far as the losing
side-and Paul-were concerned. Thus in 1 Corinthians, written around A.D.55, Paul
steps in to arbitrate the case himself, on moral rather than legal grounds.
We do not know why the court ruled in favour of the immoral man (or maybe
simply refused to hear the case), or even if it was a Roman court. But if it was a Roman
provincial court,47 and the charge against the man was adultery or incest-all of which
is well within the bounds of current scholarly opinion-then he might have exonerated
himself by arguing that, as his father was no longer alive, his stepmother was no longer
his mother in any legal sense.48In other words, the potestas or ius of his father over his
stepmother had ended with his father's death. Thus, the principle that Paul recites in
Romans 7.1, 'the law of the person has jurisdiction as long as he lives', may have been
something he learned through his efforts at sorting out this controversy.
While there are a fair number of 'ifs' in this hypothesis, the derivation of Paul's
knowledge of 'the law of the person' from the Corinthian situation seems to explain
why, in Romans 7.2-3, he illustrates the principle with an example concerning
remarriage,even though this example fits poorly with his application of the principle
in 7.4-6.49 Further, a Corinthian origin gains considerable support from yet another
text in 1 Corinthians. This is 7.39, where Paul gives his advice on the remarriage of a
widow:
6t Jv~p
v U
&'ESaL
Xpo'vov
Oov
FUvv'
t1'
a'vr-js
avd- q'so-laOv
1EAEL
tcyauqI7vaL, /LOvovV KUptp.

hrp, E'AEvOE'pa
Eui-ieV
,

A woman is bound as long as her husbandlives. But if the husbanddies, she is free to be
marriedto whomshe wants,only in the Lord.
Like Romans 7.1-3, this passage contains legal jargon, namely AEuOdEpa
Eartv C
OEAEtyaleqO-vat, which is a standard element in divorce documents,50and EW' "aov
Xpdvov,which we have seen in the papyri. It also has word-for-word parallels to the
Romans text. Thus yuvv7 SE'Eratand E ' 8ov Xpdvov
are common to both
"
"
•,
passages, and E v 8Ko4~l6'
•&vP,
AEUO'pa rt'v in 1 Corinthians differs by
only one word from the dv8vd8EroOd&v' JdvIp,
oTl'v in Romans. Since
,UVOE'pa and ideas from the
Romans elsewhere shows a pattern of Paul using
phrases
46 Will Deming, 'The unity of 1 Corinthians 5-6', Journal of Biblical Literature 115 (1996),
289-312.
47 A provincial setting would explain the presence in Romans 7.1-3 of parallels to Greek law
(see above). Further,according to Acts 18.12-17, Paul had had dealings with the Roman court in

Corinthpreviousto this.

48 This would not have been a good defence in Gaius' day, of course (Inst. 1.59, 63), but see the
report in Philo, Legat. 71-2.
49 On the logical inconsistency of Paul's argument in 7.2-6, see Kaisemann(n. 35), 190; Jones,
119; and Fitzmyer,455.
50 For example P.W. Pestman, Marriage and Matrimonial Property in Ancient Egypt (Leiden,
1961), 73-4, 181.
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Corinthian situation as the basis for examples and paraenetic material,51the simplest
explanation for this correspondence is that Romans 7.1-3 derives from Paul's
experiences in Corinth.52
In an attempt to tie together these observations, let me suggest the following
scenario. In sorting out the aftermath of a lawsuit between members of his Corinthian
church, Paul inquires into aspects of Roman law relevant to the case, including a
principle known as 'the law of the person'. This was a principle current among
solicitors and legal advisors practising law at a fairly low level, having been developed
in the context of elementary legal studies, and may have been familiar to Paul through
his own education. Paul has opportunity to use this knowledge in both 1 Corinthians
7.39 and Romans 7.1-3. The main difference between these passages is that in Romans
he underscores the technical nature of his knowledge with such phrases as 'I speak to
ones who know law', 'the law of the person', 'bound by law', 'the living husband',
'released from the law of the husband', and 'freefrom the law'. He does this because he
sees a rhetorical advantage in complimenting his Roman audience as 'ones who know
law' and then employing legal jargon that might impress them and lend weight to his
argument. He is, moreover,particularly interested in showcasing the clause 'the law of
the person has jurisdiction as long as he lives'53because it brings together, in an
authoritative formulation, key notions of his discussion in chapters 6 and 7 (namely
and death).54In this manner he capitalizes on a legal phrase that
KUpLEUWo,
vo•Los,
focuses and
advances his theological argument.55

CONCLUSION
The foregoing study has inquired into the origins of the phrase iuspersonarum, which
first appears in Gaius' Institutes in the mid-second century A.D. I have shown on
grounds both internal and external to the Institutes that this phrase may have existed
before Gaius; that the Christian writer Paul used a similar phrase in Greek in his
letter to the Romans; and that there is good reason to suppose that both have
reference to the same basic entity within Roman civil law. Finally, I have put forth a
hypothesis that explains how Paul came to know of this phrase. I have postulated that
he became familiar with it through his involvement in a lawsuit between members of
his Corinthian church, as documented in 1 Corinthians 5-7.
I conclude from this that the phrase ius personarumwas used in Roman law, at least
in classroom instruction, as far back as the mid-first century A.D.,and possibly earlier.
If Paul was familiar with it through his congregation's involvement with a provincial
court around A.D.55, and he wrote to Christians in Rome, which he had never visited,
expecting that a reference to this phrase in Greek would add weight to his argument
among 'ones who know law', then it is logical to suppose that the phrase had acquired
5' ForexampleCranfield,2.691-3.
52 Cf. the analysisin Jones,119-20, 121.
,
vo'toscfrom 7ro
53 Both by his pointed introductionand by the emphaticseparationof
Thisseparationalso moves70odv-Op'rnov closerto the end of the sentence,thereby
dvOpdw'rov.
whichis not pretty,wouldbe 6 vdoos 70rov
clarifyingthe subjectof . Thealternative,
dvOpdrov
E O0OV
KUPLEVEL
E'
xp0
VOV .
ch. 7; anddeathis a
54 KUpLEtO occursin 6.9, 14;vd'losoccursin 6.14,15andthroughout
themein 6.1-11, 23, andmostof ch. 7.
" Paul'scitationof Mosaiclaw
(Deuteronomy27.26)in Galatians3.10 functionsin a similar
way,bringingtogetherthe conceptsof 'law'and 'curse'in an authoritative
legalformulation.See
E. P.Sanders,Paul(Oxford,1991),57-8.
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a wide currency by this time. Perhaps it had already achieved an authoritative standing
in some of the more humble circles of legal education. From this we could infer that its
origins lie somewhere in the first half of the first century A.D.Alternatively,it may have
only recently become a subject of discussion. In this case we could understand Romans
7.1 as a reference to one of the latest advances in legal pedagogy, and we could locate
the origins of iuspersonarumtoward the middle of the first century.
To the extent that this conclusion seems reasonable, it holds important implications
for the history of the conceptualization of Roman law, and perhaps also for the
development of the Institutionensystem.By comparing Paul and Gaius we have determined that a principle entitled iuspersonarum/6
existed at least a
vOpthrrov
vdtos 70rolit was used at that time to
before
its
in
the
Institutes.
Moreover,
appearance
century
conceptualize the logic of private laws-potentially a broad range of these laws-that
pertained to the legal status of one person during another's lifetime. Thus, there is
evidence that elements of the civil code were being systematized by means of legal
principles already in early classical law. When iuspersonarumfinally surfaces in Gaius,
this tendency is even more pronounced. Here the phrase stands somewhere between a
principle and a category of law, a situation made possible by the ambiguity of ius in
Gaius' day. Thus Gaius uses ius personarum in the same way he uses the simpler
designations res and actiones, as titles for the three divisions of civil law.
At minimum, this reading of the evidence raises questions about the pace at which
the systemization of law took place between these two points, Paul and Gaius, and
hence also about Gaius' own creativity and contribution to the process. In the face of
such questions, it will be more difficult for scholars to defend the view that Gaius'
systemization of Roman civil law was entirely original. In turn, those holding the more
cautious view, that the Institutionensystemwas the creation of 'Gaius or an unknown
predecessor',56will find it incumbent upon them to explore more explicitly the possibility that this predecessor belonged not to Gaius' century but to the one before.
The Universityof Portland

WILL DEMING
deming@up.edu

56 For example Wieacker (1969), 466-7, 477.
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